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ABSTRACT
If the probability of default increases
with the debt burden, the set of feasible
rescheduling schem es of a sovereign
debt to private creditors can be depicted
by an inverted U-shaped curve in the
annual repaym ent-repaym ent period
plane. If both the creditor and the
indebted sovereign are risk averse and
m axim ise expected utility from debt
re p a y m e n ts
and
u n p a id
d e b t,
resp ectiv ely , the P a reto e fficie n t
rescheduling schemes might be located
on the upward sloping side of the
feasible rescheduling curve, displaying a
p o sitiv e rela tio n sh ip betw een the
renegotiated annual repayment and the
renegotiated repayment period, rather
than the conventional trade-off. (/EL
F34)

Associate Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at the
University of Wollongong and a Senior Lecturer in the Department of
Economics at Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel.

I

Introduction

The heavy burden of external debts on the developing
countries has led to a heightened concern about these
countries' ability and commitment to repay their liabilities.
This concern is rooted in the fact that, unlike a private debt, a
sovereign debt is not subjected to laws of bankruptcy or to an
enforcement of a collateral. Thus, when the potential penalties
on default are not substantial, a rise in a country's level of
indebtedness reduces that country's inclination to service its
external liabilities. It is possible, however, that the probability
of unilateral repudiation is moderated by a country's concern
about the adverse effect of a default on its trustw orthy
reputation and, subsequently, on its access to foreign loans
(Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Kletzer, 1984; and Grossman and
Van Huyck, 1988) and by a threat of direct sanctions (Bulow
and Rogoff, 1989).
In view of the developing coun tries' high level of
indebtedness, it has been argued by Krugman (1989) that a
country's financial obligations act like a high marginal tax rate
which deters governments from taking painful m easures to
improve a country's economic performance and discourages
capital formation. Thus, when an indebted country is on the
downward sloping side of the 'debt relief Laffer curve', both
debtor and creditor can benefit from a debt-reduction. Kenen
(1990) and Sachs (1990) have asserted that the external debt's
overhang is a prim ary cause for economic slow-down for
many of the developing countries and have recommended the
establishm ent of an international institution for organising
debt relief and debt-rescheduling negotiations between private
creditors and indebted countries. In contrast, Bulow and Rogoff
(1990) have argued that the external debt problem is a

symptom of poor economic management and growth, that the
presence of official creditors in debt negotiations ossifies the
bargaining position of private creditors, and that efficiency
would be best served by having less official involvement.
The basic approach for solving the developing countries'
debt problem has been rescheduling and concerted lending.
Alternatively, market-based debt-reduction schemes, such as
debt buy-backs, securitisation and debt-equity swaps, have been
suggested. They have been expected to reduce both the
exposure of banks and the external liabilities of countries
without the need for a collective bargaining of new credit or
debt forgiveness, which might be accompanied by a severe free
rider problem. How ever, as has been shown by Krugman
(1989), these m arket-based debt-reduction schem es cannot
serve as an alternative to the orthodox strategy of rescheduling
and concerted lending.
Assuming that a country's inclination to repay its liabilities
decreases with its debt burden, but that the costs of repudiation
are substantial, and recognising that a short-term illiquidity
does not necessarily lead to a long-term insolvency, this paper
firstly analyses the set of debt-rescheduling schemes which are
feasible for both the debtor and the creditor. Subsequently, the
paper analyses the Pareto efficient rescheduling schem es for
the creditor and the debtor under the assumption that they are
risk averse and maximise expected utility from the sum of debt
repaym ents and from the unpaid debt, respectively. The
structure and the major findings of the paper are as follows.
Section II analyses the debt-repayment constraint and the set
of the rescheduling schemes which are feasible for both the
debtor and the creditor. It shows that this set can be depicted by
an inverted U -shaped curve in the annual repaym entrepayment period plane.
Section III describes the creditor's choice of a rescheduling

scheme from the set of the feasible schemes. It postulates that
the creditor's choice of the annual debt-repayment and the
debt-repaym ent period m axim ises the creditor's expected
utility from the perceived sum of annual debt-repaym ents
subject to the debt-repaym ent constraint, and provides a
geometrical presentation of the creditor's rescheduling choice.
It is argued that the creditor's indifference curves in the annual
repayment-repayment period plane can be upward sloping and
hence the creditor's optimal rescheduling scheme can be on
the upward sloping side of the feasible rescheduling curve.
That is, it is possible that the creditor prefers to bear a lower
risk of default and hence requires the sm allest am ount of
annual repayment between the two feasible ones associated
with his preferred length of the repayment period.
Section IV analyses the properties of the creditor's most
preferred rescheduling scheme. In particular, it highlights the
effects of the international interest rate, the country's external
liabilities and potential output and the creditor's market share
on the creditor's choice of a rescheduling scheme.
Sectio n V an aly ses the d eb to r's p referen ces about
resch ed u lin g schem es and indicates that the d eb to r's
ind ifference curves are downward sloping in the plane
spanned by the annual repayment and the repayment period
and that the debtor prefers rescheduling schemes characterised
by a shorter repayment period but not necessarily a sm aller
annual repaym ent due to an increase in the probability of
admissible default as the annual repayment rises.
Section VI considers both the creditor's and the debtor's
preferences about the feasible rescheduling schem es and
demonstrates that it is possible that the Pareto efficient set of
rescheduling schemes is located on the upward sloping side of
the feasible rescheduling curve below (and including) the
creditor's choice and hence revealing a positive relationship

between the length of the repayment period and the amount of
the annual repayment rather than a trade-off.
Finally, section VII concludes the paper w ith a b rief
summary.

IL

Debt-Repayment Constraint and the Feasible Rescheduling
Curve

The follow ing analysis considers a situation in w hich a
country is liable to a single private creditor, or to a wellcoordinated syndicate of private creditors. It is assumed that
the co u n try 's external liabilities cannot be serviced in
accordance with the originally contracted terms, and that both
the indebted country and its creditor have a su fficien t
incentive for rescheduling the country's liabilities (Do) over a
T-year period in equal, in constant prices, annual repayments
(M) of principal and interest. An underlying rationale for equal
annual repayments can be a creditor's aversion and a debtor's
aversion toward excessive oscillations in their business cycles
that might stem from a variable annual repayment.
Dealing with a sovereign country and assuming that the
debtor's asset holdings abroad are negligible, the creditor is
aware of the fact that his control over the rescheduled
repayment is fairly limited. Nevertheless, it is assum ed that
the probability of default (p) perceived by the creditor is sm aller
than one due to the substantial costs that can be inflicted
directly by retaliatory sanctions, such as a ban on trade and
credit, and indirectly through a loss of trustworthy reputation.
It is assumed further that the perceived probability of default:
1. increases with the burden of servicing the debt, which is
measured by the ratio of the ren eg otiated annual repayment
(M) to the indebted country's level of gross national product
(or export) in constant prices (Y); and 2. decreases with the

creditor's ability to retaliate by limiting the country access to
the international credit market proportional to the creditor's
market share (s). These assumptions are incorporated into the
following linear expression:
p = a(M /Y ) - Xs.

(1)

Here, a is a positive scalar indicating the marginal effect of
the debt burden on the country's inclination to default.
Following Berg and Sachs (1988), it can be argued that a is
affected by the indebted country's social, political and economic
structure. Sim ilarly, X is a positive scalar indicating the
deterrent effect of the creditor's power in the international
credit market.
It is also assumed that the indebted country's investment is
adversely affected by the annual debt repayments through a
decline in the governm ental budget for investm ent and
through an (expected and actual) increase in tax rates which, in
the presence of capital mobility, discourages capital formation
and repatriation of flight capital (Helpman, 1989). Since the
co u n try 's GN P is directly related to in v estm en t, this
assum ption im plies that the indebted country's GN P is
adversely affected by the annual debt repayment as indicated,
for convenience, by the following linear equation:

Y = Y - 5 M , fe l

(2)

where Y is the highest level of GNP attainable had the annual
debt-repayments been nil, and 8 is a positive scalar indicating
the potentially marginal and adverse effect of the renegotiated
annual debt-repaym ent on the country's GNP. Equation 2

implies that the renegotiated debt-repayment cannot exceed
Y/&
The substitution of equation 2 into equation 1 for Y implies
that the probability of default perceived by the creditor is given
ty

p = aM / (Y-8M) - As.

(3)

Since 0 < p < 1 and increases with the renegotiated annual debt
repayment, M should be restricted further to lie within the
open interv al (M min, M max)/ where p(M min) = 0 and
p (M max) = 1- The substitution of these boundary conditions
into equation 3 implies:

Mmin"(a + 8 X s )Y

(4)

1+Xs
Mmax" ( a + 5 ( l + A s ) ) Y

(5)

and

Note further that M max <Y /&
The actual annual debt-repayment (Q) is perceived by the
creditor to be distributed as follows:

r M T-aM/(Y-5M) + As
Q=

0

(6)

aM/(Y-5M)-Xs.

The nature of the analysis will not be substantially changed by
replacing the assumption of a complete default by a partial

default, i.e., an actual annual repayment of yM dollars (0 < y < l)
with probability p.
The analysis of the debt-repaym ent constraint is conducted
u nd er the sim p lify in g assu m p tion th at a -p riori the
distribution of the actual annual debt-repayment is perceived
by the creditor to be stable over the repayment period. That is,
the parameters a, 8 and
as well as the creditor's market share
and the indebted country's potential output, remain the same
over the T years of the repayment period. Alternatively, one
may incorporate, for example, an anticipation of economic
g row th, or econom ic slow dow n, into the analysis by
m ultiplying (Y - 8M) by a shift factor g ‘, where g is a positive
scalar (equal to one plus the anticipated growth rate). In view
of equation 4, the sum of the expected debt-repayments (SEDR)
discounted by the international annual (real) interest rate (r),
which is assumed to be constant, over the T-year period is
given by:

SEDR

=

T
I [l-oM /(Y-8M )+Xs]M /(l+r)t
t=0

=

[l-aM/(Y-8M)+Xs]M[p(l-pT)/(l-p)]

(7)

=

l/ ( l+ r ) .

(8)

where
P

Assum ing that the debtor and the creditor have identical
assessments of the probability of default (i.e., they both use
equation 3 and assign identical values to its parameters a, 8, X, s
and Y) and that the creditor believes that a short-term , or

current, illiquidity does not necessarily lead to a long-term
insolvency and prefers to tolerate the uncertainty about future
repayments and to renegotiate debt-repayment's terms with an
allowance for episodes of temporary illiquidity rather than
retaliate, the rescheduling schemes (M, T) which are feasible
for both the debtor and the creditor should obey the following
debt-repayment constraint:

[1 - aM/(y-5M)+As]M[p(l-pT)/(i-p)] = Do

(9)

This constraint can be equivalently rendered as

T = {log{p-(l-p)Do/[l-oM/(Y-8M)+Xs]M }/logP} -1 .

(10)

The set of all the feasible rescheduling schem es can be
depicted by a curve in the M-T plane, which is referred
hereafter as the feasib le rescheduling curve. By differentiating
equation 10 with respect to M and by recalling the assumption
that the probability of default rises with M, it can be shown
that, unlike the case of a private debt where a collateral can be
enforced, along the feasible rescheduling curve of a sovereign
debt the period of repayment is not necessarily shortened by an
increase in the annual repayment. In fact, it can be shown that
up to a critical level of annual debt-repayment, the rise in the
probability of default stem m ing from an increase in M is
dominant and hence the creditor should be compensated by a
longer repayment period. However, beyond that critical level,
the mere burden of the annual debt-repayment dominates the
probability of default and consequently the debtor has to be
compensated by a shorter repayment-period. This relationship
between the length of the repayment-period and the annual

repayment along the feasible rescheduling curve is described in
greater detail by Proposition 1 and Figure 1.
PROPOSITION 1: Along the feasible rescheduling curve

dT ,
dM

> 0 fo r

M m in < M < Y/6-<(>

= 0 for

M = Y/ 8 - <(>

< 0 for

Y/ 5 - <j><M£Mmax

(1 1 )

where
V ^ /1
(1+ Xs)
V
[(1+Xs
[(1+As)&hx] '
The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix.

Figure 1. The Feasible Rescheduling Curve

(1 2 )

Figure 1 illustrates the above-mentioned proposition by
displaying the set of all the rescheduling schemes which are
feasible for both the debtor and the creditor,
Q = {(M,T)e

[l-oM /(Y-8M )+As]M [p(l-pT)/(1.p)]=DD}/

as an inverted U-shaped curve in the plane spanned by M and
T. Equation 9 indicates further that an increase in the debtor's
initial liabilities and an increase in the international interest
rate shift the feasible rescheduling curve upward, whereas an
increase in the country's potential GNP level and an increase
in the creditor's m arket share in the international credit
market shift the curve downward by reducing the probability
of default.
The above analysis of the feasible rescheduling curve has
been conducted under the assumption that the debtor's state is
common knowledge. This assumption can be justified by the
expectations for a very high degree of caution to be practiced by
creditors in dealing with an insolvent debtor. This high degree
of cau tion should lead to an extensive acq u isitio n of
information related to the future performance of the indebted
country. T he co sts of acquiring such inform ation are
moderated by the econom ies of scale associated with the
establishment of a syndicate of creditors and by the data and
research reports publicised by international organisations such
as The W orld Bank and the International M onetary Fund. If
information used in the formation of expectations about the
probability of default is rather asymmetric in the sense that the
creditor and debtor have different sources of information and
hence assign different values to the parameters of equation 3 a,

6,
s and Y , it is likely that the debtor would claim that the
probability of default is lower than that perceived by the
creditor, for any given amount of annual debt-repayment, in

order to obtain a shorter repayment period than that required
by the creditor. (Cf. Kletzer, 1989.) That is, under the alternative
assumption of asymmetric information about the probability
of default, it is likely that the feasible rescheduling curve
considered by the debtor lies below the feasible rescheduling
curve considered by the creditor.
The follow ing sections describe the creditor's and the
debtor's choices of a rescheduling scheme from the feasible set.

IIL Creditor's Choice of a Feasible Rescheduling Scheme
It is postulated that the creditor's choice of an annual debtrepaym ent and a debt-repaym ent period is a feasible
com bination (M ,T ) which maximises his expected utility
from the perceived sum of the actual debt-repayments subject
to the debt-repayment constraint described in the previous
section. By virtue of equation 6, the number of years in which
the indebted country is expected to be liquid and make the
rescheduled annual repayment is a random variable 0 <, X < T
having a binomial distribution b(T, 1 - p). It is expected that in
T - X of the years the indebted country would not be liquid and
hence would not be able to make the rescheduled annual debt
repayment. Consequently, the sum of debt-repayments (MX)
received during the rescheduled period is perceived by the
creditor as a random variable. For convenience, it is assumed
that the creditor's level of satisfaction from the perceived sum
of d ebt-rep aym ents can be found from the n eg a tiv eexponential utility function:
uc (MX) = l-exp(-RcMX)

(13)

where Rc is a positive scalar indicating the creditor's degree of
absolute risk-aversion. (For a discussion of the properties and

generality of the negative-exponential utility function see
Hammond, 1974.)
By taking the expectation of both sides of equation 13, the
cre d ito r's expected u tility from the accum ulated d ebtrepayments can be expressed as
E[uc(MX)] = 1 -E[exp(-RCMX)].

(14)

Recalling that X has a binomial distribution, E[exp(-RCMX)] can
be interpreted as the m om ent-generating function of the
binomial distribution evaluated at -RCM. Therefore,
E[uc (MX)] = 1 - [p+(l-p)exp(-RcM)F

(15) •

and the cred itor's rescheduling problem can be regarded
equivalently as choosing M min< M < M max and T as to m axim ise
the right-hand side of equation 15 subject to the expected debtrepaym ent constraint 10 and the perceived probability of
default d isp lay ed by equation 3. An o u tlin e o f the
m athem atical solution to this problem is given in the
Appendix.
Due to the computational complexity of the problem, it is
useful to consider the geometrical presentation of the creditor's
preferences and rescheduling choice in the M -T plane. A
creditor's indifference curve can be defined as the locus of all
com binations of M and T which yield the sam e level of
expected utility from the sum of debt repayments.

PROPOSITION 2: The creditor's in d ifferen ce
upward sloping in the M -T plane for all
M > r^ ln

cu rves

are

y + ( l- p ) R
p'

The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.
Since the effect of an increase in the annual repayment on
the probability of default is positive and increases with M (i.e.,
p '> 0
and p " > 0 ,
as in d ic a te d
by
e q u a tio n 3,
( l / R c)ln{[p'+(l-p)Rc ] / p'} diminishes as M increases. Thus, the
larger the value of M the greater the likelihood that the
rescheduling schemes constituted by M are lying on upward
sloping indifference curves. Recalling that p(M max) = 1/ the
right-hand side of the inequality indicated in proposition 2 is
equal to zero and hance the creditor's indifference curves are
upward sloping in the vicinity of M max. Moreover, equation 3
indicates that the larger a and 8 and the smaller Y, the smaller
the value of (l-p )/p ' and, consequently, the larger the range of
M for which the creditor's indifference curves are upward
sloping. These arguments and the fact that p(M m,n) = 0 imply
that proposition 2 can be extended as follows.

PROPOSITION 2': I f M min £

ln [ l + RC/p'(M min)1, the

creditor's indifference curves are upward sloping in the
M -T plane for all M min< M < M max- .

The analysis of the creditor's choice of a rescheduling
schem e proceeds under the assum ption that the intrinsic
value of p' is considerably large so that the condition indicated

in proposition 2 ' is satisfied and, consequently, the creditor's
indifference curves are upward sloping in the M-T plane for all
Mmin< M < M max.
The differentiation of equation A .17 with respect to T
implies that as long as the creditor's indifference curves are
upward sloping
d2T
dMdT |E(uc ) = const. >
Thus, the longer the repaym ent period the steep er the
indifference curve. This, in turn, implies that the creditor's
indifference curves are convex in the M-T plane and that as
one m oves upward along a perpendicular line in the M-T
plane the slope of the creditor's indifference curves increases.
By virtue of equation 15 and the fact that 0 < p + (l-p )e x p (RCM )<1, the creditor's expected utility increases with T for any
given level of M. In view of this property and that the
creditor's indifference curves are upward sloping, the creditor's
expected utility from the perceived sum of the actual debtrepayments declines with the annual debt-repayment for any
given period of repayment. The underlying rationale is that a
rise in the annual payment, ceteris p aribu s, increases the
p robability of d efau lt and, co n sequ en tly , low ers the
expectations for debt-repayment and also raises the costs of risk
bearing.
Since the creditor's expected utility rises with T for any
given value of M and the creditor's indifference curves are,
under the aforem entioned assumption, upward sloping and
convex, there exists a unique and interior solution to the
cred itor's rescheduling problem — the cred itor's optim al
rescheduling scheme is the tangency point A=(M , T ) between
the upward sloping side of the feasible rescheduling curve and

the highest possible indifference curve as depicted in Figure 2.
Since this tangency point is located on the upward sloping
segm ent of the feasible rescheduling curve, the creditor's
choice of the annual repayment lies in the open interval
IMmin/(y/S-4>)]- That is, given the debt-repayment period T%
the creditor prefers to bear a lower risk of default and rather
selects M * than the higher feasible level of annual debtrepayment M i.

Figure 2. The Creditor's Choice of a Feasible Rescheduling Scheme

IV. Comparative Statics of the Creditor's Choice of a Feasible
Rescheduling Scheme
The analysis of the properties of the creditor's choice of the
debt rescheduling scheme described above is summarised by
propositions 3-5. Each proposition is follow ed by a brief
d iscu ssion that outlines the proof and the underlying
rationale.
PROPOSITION 3: An increase in either the international credit
m arket's interest rate or the debtor's in itial liabilities
changes the creditor's choice o f the rescheduling schem e
in fav or o f a longer period o f repayment and a sm aller
an n u al repaym ent.

An increase in either the international interest rate (r) or the
debtor's initial liabilities (e.g., from concerted lending) shifts
the feasible rescheduling curve upward. Recalling also that the
slope of the creditor's indifference curves increases with T, the
tangency point between the new feasible rescheduling curve
and a higher indifference curve is above and to the left of the
initial one. Note further that an increase in the debtor's initial
liabilities m ight also affect the slope of the cre d ito r's
indifference curves by reducing the creditor's tangible wealth
and consequently changing his attitude toward risk. However,
the differentiation of equation A.17 with respect to Rc does not
provide a clear indication of the direction of that change. If an
increase in the creditor's degree of risk aversion moderates the
slope of the indifference curves, it reduces, or even offsets, the
decline in M imposed by the upward shift of the feasible
rescheduling curve. Thus, if the creditor's degree of absolute

risk aversion rises with a reduction in his tangible wealth, the
increase in the debtor's initial liabilities might also increase the
annual debt repayment required by the debtor. In any other
circumstances, the annual repayment required by the creditor
decreases as the d ebtor's initial liabilities increase. This
proposition also implies that a debt-reduction shortens the
repayment period. However, a debt-reduction does not affect
the creditor's tangible wealth and (subsequently) the creditor's
degree of risk aversion and indifference curves. Thus, a debtreduction raises the annual debt repayment required by the
creditor.
PROPOSITION 4:

An

increase in

the

indebted

country's

shortens the repayment period, but may not
increase the annual repaym ent, if the
indifference curves are steepened; or
ii. increases the annual repayment, but may not
sh o rten the repaym ent period, if the
indifference curves are flattened.

necessarily
cred ito r's

potential output (Y)
i.

necessarily
cred itor's

An increase in the country's potential output reduces the
probability of default perceived by the creditor and debtor for
any given amount of annual debt-repayment and hence shifts
the feasible rescheduling curve downward. By virtue of
equation 3, the greater the marginal effect of the debt burden
on the country's inclination to default (i.e., a ), the larger the
downward shift of the feasible rescheduling curve for a given
increase in the country's potential output. Moreover, equation
A .17 indicates that an increase in the country's potential
output may also change the slope of the creditor's indifference

curves since p, p ' and 0 are affected by Y. H ow ever, the
differentiation of equation A.17 with respect to Y indicates that
the change in the slope of the creditor's indifference curves is
not clear a-p riori. If the increase in Y steepens the creditor's
indifference curves, the tangency point between the low er
rescheduling curve and a steeper indifference curve should
reveal a shorter repayment period but not necessarily a larger
annual repayment. The steeper the (new) indifference curve
and the larger the downward shift of the feasible rescheduling
curve (i.e., the larger the a ), the smaller the likelihood of a
larger annual repaym ent. In contrast, if the increase in Y
flattens the creditor's indifference curves, the (new) tangency
point should reveal a larger annual repaym ent but not
necessarily a shorter repayment period. The flatter the (new)
indifference curve and the smaller the downward shift of the
feasible rescheduling curve (i.e., the smaller the a ), the smaller
the likelihood of a shorter repayment period.
PROPOSITION 5: An increase in the creditor's market share
i.

shortens the repayment period, but may
in crease the annual repaym ent, if
indifference curves are steepened; or
ii. increases the annual repayment, but may
sh o rten the repaym ent period, if
indifference curves are flattened.

not necessarily
the cre d ito r's
not necessarily
the cred ito r's

Private creditors can substantially increase their control
over the international credit market by increasing their market
share through mergers and syndication. Equation 3 indicates

that an increase in the creditors' market share raises the
potential costs of default for the debtor and hence reduces the
probability of default for any given amount of annual debt
repayment proportional to A. In terms of Figure 1, the feasible
rescheduling curve shifts downward. Furthermore, equation
A.17 indicates that an increase in the creditor's control over the
international credit market may also change the slope of the
creditor's indifference curves since p, p' and 0 are affected by s.
However, the differentiation of equation A.17 with respect to s
indicates that the change in the slope of the cred itor's
indifference curves is not clear a -p r io r i. Sim ilarly to the
discussion of proposition 4, if the increase in the creditor's
market share steepens his indifference curves, the tangency
point between the lower rescheduling curve and a steeper
indifference curve should reveal a shorter repayment period
but not necessarily a larger annual repayment. The steeper the
(new) indifference curve and the larger the downward shift of
the feasible rescheduling curve (i.e., the larger the A,), the
sm aller the likelihood of a larger annual repaym ent. In
contrast, if the increase in the creditor's control over the
international credit market flattens his indifference curves, the
(new) tangency point should reveal a larger annual repayment
but not necessarily a shorter repayment period. The flatter the
(new) indifference curve and the smaller the downward shift
of the feasible rescheduling curve (i.e., the smaller the A,), the
smaller the likelihood of a shorter repayment period.

V.

Debtor's Choice of a Feasible Rescheduling Scheme

In analogy to the creditor's problem, the debtor's objective is
postulated as m axim ising expected u tility from actually
repaying as little as possible, subject to the expected debtrepayment constraint portrayed by the feasible rescheduling
curve. That is, the larger the amount of actually unpaid debt
(Do - MX) the higher the debtor's level of satisfaction.
Similarly to the analysis of the creditor's preferences, it is
assumed that the debtor's preferences can be represented by the
following negative exponential utility function
ud = l-exp{-Rd(D0-MX)}

(17)

where Rd is a positive scalar indicating the debtor's degree of
absolute risk aversion. In which case,
E(ud) = l-exp(-RdDb)E[exp(RdMX)].

(18)

Since X is a random variable having a binomial distribution
b(T,l-p), E[exp(R^MX)] is the moment-generating function of
the binomial distribution evaluated at R ^M and consequently
the debtor's expected utility function can be expressed as:
EIudOo-MX)] = l-exp(-Rd Do)[p + (l-p)exp(RdM)]T.

PROPOSITION 6: The debtor's in d ifferen ce
downward sloping in the M -T plane.

cu rv es

The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.

(19)

a re

Furthermore, the differentiation of equation 19 with respect
to T implies
dE[ud(D0 -M X)]
_
^
“-------- = - y Tlog\|/<0

(20)

for every M>0 since
V = p(M) + (l-p(M )) exp(RdM) > 1.

(21)

Thus, the debtor's indifference curves which are closer to the
origin represent higher levels of expected utility. That is, the
debtor prefers feasible rescheduling schemes characterised by
an annual repayment smaller than M * and a repayment period
shorter than T * as well as feasible rescheduling schem es
characterised by an annual repayment larger than M and a
repayment period shorter than T to the creditor's choice A =
(M *, T * ) as depicted by sections A A ' and BB' of the feasible
rescheduling curve in Figure 3 below. In the context of Figure
3, the debtor's most preferred rescheduling scheme is A ', which
is associated with the minimum annual debt repayment. More
g enerally, the solution to the debtor's expected u tility
maximisation problem (by repaying as little as possible) is a
com er one — either the feasible scheme associated with the
m inim um am ount of annual repaym ent or the feasible
scheme associated with the maximum annual repayment. In
the latter case, the high probability of adm issible default
compensates for the large renegotiated annual repayment.

Figure 3. The Debtor's Choice of a Rescheduling Scheme

VI. Pareto Efficient Rescheduling Schemes
The Pareto efficient rescheduling schemes constitute a set of all
those feasible schemes which are superior to the rest in the
sense that either the creditor or debtor is better off while the
other is not worse off. The particular com bination of the
creditor's and debtor's preferences displayed in Figure 4 im plies
that the set of the Pareto efficient rescheduling schemes might
be entirely located on the upward sloping section A 'A of the
feasible rescheduling curve which is bounded from above by
the creditor's most preferred scheme A and from below by the

debtor's most preferred scheme A'. The underlying rationale is
that by having a choice from section AB the debtor is worse off
while the creditor is not better off. Moreover, by having a
choice from section A 'A the creditor is better off than by
having a choice from section BB' while the debtor is not worse
off and even better off in section A'C.

Figure 4.

The Pareto Efficient Set of Rescheduling Schemes
under Symmetric Information

Section A 'A defines the Pareto efficient set of rescheduling
schemes from which the rescheduling scheme is likely to be
obtained w ithin a bargaining process characterised by
symm etric information. Obviously, the greater the creditor's
(debtor's) relative bargaining power, the closer the negotiated
rescheduling scheme to point A (A'). However, if information

is asymmetric, it is likely that the feasible rescheduling curve
considered by the debtor lies below the feasible rescheduling
curve considered by the creditor, as is argued in section II. In
which case, the Pareto efficient rescheduling schem es are
located in the shaded area A'D AF as indicated in Figure 5.
Since the creditor prefers A to E, while the debtor remains
indifferent, E and, by a similar argument, the combinations of
M and T in its close vicinity, are not Pareto efficient
rescheduling schemes.

Figure 5. The Pareto Efficient Set of Rescheduling Schemes
under Asymmetric Information

VIL

Conclusion

Assuming that a country's inclination to default increases
with its external debt burden, but decreases with the potential
loss of access to the international credit m arket, and
recognising that a short-term illiquidity does not necessarily
lead to a long-term insolvency, this paper analysed the set of
feasible rescheduling schemes and described the creditor's and
debtor's choices of rescheduling schemes from the feasible set
within a framework in which they are both risk averse and
maximise expected utility.
It was shown that the feasible rescheduling set can be
depicted by an inverted U-shaped curve in the plane spanned
by the annual repayment and the repayment period. It was also
shown that if the probability of default is sufficiently sensitive
to changes in the annual debt repayment, the creditor's most
preferred scheme might be on the upward sloping section of
the feasible rescheduling curve. This finding indicates that the
creditor may prefer to bear a lower risk of default and hence
may require the least amount of annual repayment between
the two feasible ones associated with his preferred choice of a
repayment period. The analysis also indicated the effects of the
international interest rate, the country's external debt and
potential output and the creditor's m arket share on the
creditor's choice of a rescheduling scheme.
The analysis of the debtor's preferences indicated that if the
debtor has an aversion toward risk, his indifference curves are
dow nw ard sloping in the plane spanned by the annual
repaym ent and the repayment period. In which case, the
debtor's problem has a com er solution. The debtor prefers
feasible rescheduling schem es characterised by a shorter
repayment period, but not necessarily by a sm aller annual

repaym ent due to an increase in the probability of an
admissible default as the annual repayment rises.
Finally, the paper demonstrated that the set of the Pareto
efficient rescheduling schemes might be located on the upward
sloping side of the feasible rescheduling curve below (and
including) the creditor's choice and hence reflects that in the
case of a sovereign debt there can be a positive relationship
between the length of the repayment period and the amount of
the annual repayment rather than the conventional trade-off
which is a characteristic of a private debt-repayment.
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APPENDIX
P roof o f Proposition 1: Recall that

lo g .

(l-p)Do
P[l-ocM/(Y-5M)+Xs]M
logp

T=

(A .l)

The slope of the feasible rescheduling curve is found by
differentiating equation A.l w.r.t. M:

'(1 -b)D0 '

{ 8[(l+Xs)S+a]M2 - 2[(l+Xs)8+a]YM+(l+Xs)Y2}

dT

dM
(logP) {[1-aM/(7-8M)+Xs]M}2 (Y-8M)2
A

V

V

0

0

0

0

(A.2)
Note that as long as r>0, p e l and hence log|3<0. Recalling that
T >0, it is required, therefore, that the numerator of the first
term on the r.h.s. of equation A .l would be negative:

(l-p)DQ
lo g .

[1-<xM /(Y -8 M )+ X s ]M.

<0.

(A.3)

Consequently, the denominator of equation A.2 is positive,
and recalling that P<1, we obtain that

< * T > rt „ _ w , 2 Y W
dM ^ 0 as V ^ M2 - T M +

(l+Xs)Y2

= 0.

Note that

dV
ZY
dM = 2 M ’ T

v
(A4)

and that
d2V
S nP
That is, V is a convex function of M. Moreover, equation 2
indicates that the feasible range of annual debt repayment is 0 <
M < Y/ 8. In this range

dV
2Y
dM = 2 M - 8 " < 0

Y
for every M < ^ (including M max) as depicted in Figure A l.

<A 6 >

M

Figure A.1

The roots of V are
M i ,2 =Y/8±<t>

(A.7)

where

y

I
g + A ir ~
V ^ K l+ X s J& fa ]-

(A.8)

Since it is assumed that 8>1 and X and a are positive, then <J> > 0
and Y / 8 + <|> is not in the feasible range. Thus,

> 0 for 0 < M < Y/ 8 VS

= 0 f o r M = V /8 - <|>

(A'9)

< 0 for Y/ 8 - <J> <M<Y/ 8

and consequently,

>
dT J
dM I

0 for M m jn < M < Y /8 - <t>

= 0 for M = Y/ 8 - <|)

(A 10)

< 0 for Y /8 - <(> <M £M max- ®

M ath em atical p resen tation o f the cred itor's c h o ice: By
substituting the constraint 10 into equation 15 for T and then
differentiating with respect to M, the necessary condition for
maximum expected utility for the creditor from the perceived
sum of actual debt-repayments is:
dEtdM X)1 = -e(M*)T(M*)(T(MV (M*)/e(MV •T(M*)1oge(M>)1 = 0

(A.11)

where
0(M*) = p(M*) + [l-p(M*)]exp(-RcM*)

(A.12)

T(M*) = {log{p-(l-p)D0/[l-aMV(Y-8M*)+Xs]M*)/logP} -1

(A.13)

p(M*) = aM*/(Y-8M*) - Xs

(A .l 4)

and 0'(M *) and T'(M *) are the derivatives of 0 (M *) and T(M *),
respectively, with respect to M evaluated at the optim al level
M *. Given that the second-order condition for m axim um is
satisfied, the necessary condition A .ll yields the creditor's
optim al level of renegotiated annual debt-repaym ent as a
function of the model's parameters:

M * = f(Do,Y, r, a , 8, X, s, R c)

(A.15)

and the substitution of f(Do, Y, r, a , 8, X, s, R c) into equation
A.13 for M* gives the optim al repayment period of the
rescheduled debt:

T* = g(Do, Y, r, a, 8, X, s, R c).

(A .l 6)

P roof o f Proposition 2: The total differential of equation 15
implies that the slope of such an indifference curve is given by:

dT
T{exp(-RcM)[p'+Rc (l-p)] -pQ
dM |E(uc)=const. ~
01og0
where
0 = p(M) + [l-p(M)]exp(-Rc M).

(A.18)

Equation A.18 implies that for a risk averse creditor O<0<1 and
hence the denominator in the above expression is negative.
Consequently,

dT
dM I E(uc)=const. <

<rc

I

p

J

(A.19)

P roof o f Proposition 6: By totally differentiating equation 19,
we obtain that the slope of the debtor's indifference curve in
the M-T plane is

dT
dM |E(ud) = const.

-T(exp(RdM)[Rd(l-p)-p'1+p'}
ylogvy

where
V a p(M) + (l-p(M )) exp(RdM).

(A.21)

Since y > l for every M>0, y lo g y is always positive and

dM I E(ud) = const. > 0
as

exp(RdM )lRd(l-p)-p']+p' | 0

M l ^

(A-22)

or, equivalently, as

ta

This implies
dT
dM I E(ud) = const. < 0

(A,23)

for all M >0 if
In

_Rd(l-p)-p'_

£0

(A.24)

or, equivalently, if

Rd(l-p)-p'
which, in turn, requires that
Rd(l-p)S>0.

(A.26)

Since it is assumed that R d>0 and 0 < p < l, the above condition
is satisfied. I

r, i!v
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